The contribution of oil to debt and under-development in Africa: The case of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project by AFRODAD
(1)// AFRICAN FORUM AND NETWORK ON DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT 
(A) Contribution of oil to d e b t 
The Contribution of Oil to Debt and 
Underdevelopment in Africa: The Case 
of the Chad-Cameroon 
Oil Pipeline Project 
AFRODAD 
BLDS 
(British Library for Development Studies) 
Institute of Deve lopment Studies 
Br ighton BN1 9RE 
Tel: (01273) 915659 Email: blds@ids.ac.uk 
Websi te : www.blds. ids.ac.uk 
Please return by: 
The Contribution of Oil to Debt and Under-Development in Africa 
The Case of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project 
ISBN 978-0-7974-3424-0 
EAN 9780797434240 
©2007 
All rights reserved to AFRODAD 
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development 
31 Atkinson Drive, Hillside, 
PO Box CY1517, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe 
Telephone 263 4 778531, 778536 Telefax 263 4 747878 
E-mail: afr idad@afrodad.co,zw 
Website: www.afrodad.org 
I D S 
0 9 4 6 1 9 
About AFRODAD 
AFRODAD Vision 
AFRODAD aspires for an equitable and sustainable development process leading to a prosperous Africa. 
AFRODAD Mission 
To secure policies that will redress the African debt crisis based on a human rights value system. 
AFRODAD Objectives include the following: 
1 To enhance efficient and effective management and use of resources by African governments; 
2 To secure a paradigm shift in the international socio-economic and political world order to a development 
processthat addresses the needs and aspirations of the majority of the people in the world. 
3 To facilitate dialogue between civil society and governments on issues related to Debt and development in 
Africaand elsewhere. 
From the vision and the mission statements and from our objectives, it is clear that the Debt crisis, apart from being 
apolitical, economic and structural issue, has an intrinsic link to human rights. This forms the guiding philosophy for 
ourwork on Debt and the need to have African external debts cancelled for poverty eradication and attainment of 
social andeconomic justice. Furthermore, the principle of equity must of necessity apply and in this regard, 
responsibility ofcreditors and debtors in the debt crisis should be acknowledged and assumed by the parties. When 
this is not done, it isa reflection of failure of governance mechanisms at the global level that protect the interests of the 
weaker nations. TheTransparent Arbitration mechanism proposed by AFRODAD as one way of dealing with the debt 
crisis finds a fundamen-tal basis in this respect. 
AFRODAD aspires for an African and global society that is just (equal access to and fair distribution of 
resources),respects human rights and promotes popular participation as a fundamental right of citizens (Arusha 
Declaration of1980). In this light, African society should have the space in the global development arena to generate 
its own solutions,uphold good values that ensure that its development process is owned and driven by its people and 
not dominated bymarkets/profits and international financial institutions. 
AFRODAD is governed by a Board of seven people from the five regions of Africa, namely East, Central, West, 
Southernand the North. The Board meets twice a year. The Secretariat, based in Harare, Zimbabwe, has a staff 
compliment of Seven programme and five support staff. 
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Preface 
AFRODAD has always believed that the causes of Africa's economic doldrums and debt crisis are both internal to the 
countries and external. External factors include the lack of responsibility on the part of the creditors resulting in loans 
not achieving their intended goals or loans being pushed. The establishment of a Debt Arbitration Tribunal will usher 
in more responsibility on the part of the Creditors and Debtors in the transactions on loans: in terms of loan 
contraction processes and use of the resources for enhancing the welfare of the masses of the people in Africa and 
elsewhere. More importantly presenting cases that show how loans miss their intended objectives before the tribunal 
is expected to result in changed behaviour on the part of both the Creditors and the Debtors. Cases of hurried 
privatization in Africa pushed in the 1980s are worth considering. 
When countries in sub-Saharan Africa became independent, the state dominated the provision of utilities. However, 
in the 1980s the debt crisis and the ensuing contraction of budgets prompted a re-appraisal of public sector provision. 
Donors began lobbying for the restructuring of public services; by the 1990s, they were demanding full-scale 
privatization. The hopes for privatization were so high that donor spending on infrastructure fell in the expectation that 
the private sector would take up the slack. For example, World Bank lending for infrastructure investment declined by 
50 per cent during 1993-2002 with much of this directed towards preparing firms for privatization. 
Many African governments in the name of good governance, competition and deregulation were forced to comply in 
exchange of balance of payment support and under the guise that it was a way to lure private investors. However, 
implementation of such reforms has been disastrous as no investors came on board. The lessons were that the bank 
did not know which lessons to teach; it also showed that countries that had ignored bank dogma (China, Vietnam, and 
India) were thriving, while those under bank tutelage did poorly. The World Bank is on record especially in Africa for 
failing to tailor projects to local conditions and for sometimes attempting to accomplish more than national 
governments can handle- failing to help cushion poor people against price and currency liberalizations, for focusing 
on the fiscal sustainability of pension systems to the detriment of the poor and for promoting the privatization of 
essential services. 
This dossier for a Fair and Transparent Arbitration mechanism demonstrates that the International Financial 
institutions' insistence and experimentation with privatization did irreparable damage that still affects the country's 
ability to stand on its economic feet today-years after such programmes were abandoned. Poor families suffered 
from the reduction in subsidies and disconnection from services when they were unable to pay. To many it meant a 
denial of basic human rights and in most cases it carries irreversible life impacts. After years of inflicting pain and 
suffering on the poor and helpless masses, it is now clear to the advocates of privatization, especially the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund that the state remains the dominant provider of health, education, water and 
electricity. The International Financial institutions are still responsible for the development set back and its 
consequences. They owe the affected a form of recompense. Cancelling debts and mere policy shifts are not 
enough. Most of the public providers of utilities in sub-Saharan Africa need substantially more financing, especially 
for investment in extending service provision. They are trapped in a vicious circle of deteriorated infrastructure, high 
system losses, high costs and low revenue. 
AFRODAD and its international partners in the civil society wishes to present this and many other cases as evidence 
for the need and cause for a fair and transparent arbitration process. Justice delayed is justice denied. 
Charles Mutasa 
Executive Director 
AFRODAD 
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Executive Summary 
This study presents the Chad Cameroon pipeline project and explores evidences on the illegitimate nature of debts 
incurred by the Cameroonian government within the framework of the Chad Cameroon Pipeline project, in view of 
building a case for the need of an international court of arbitration. 
It looks at the political, socio-economic and environmental implications of the Chad Cameron Pipeline Project from 
the pre-construction to the construction and post-construction or exploitation phases. It also investigates the 
rationale of investing in projects that hold little or no benefits to communities affected by poverty and 
underdevelopment and only cause a swelling of the debt burden of the host countries. Within the perimeter of the set 
objectives of the study we shall also critically consider the role of the international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank in increasing the debt burden of developing countries by pushing for projects that are more 
representative of corporate than people centred interests. 
The report is structured into seven sections: section 2 gives background information, followed by section 3, which is 
an overview of development aid and the economic paradox of oil. Section 4 offers a description of the Chad 
Cameroon Pipeline project and its rationale and how the project was financed with emphases on loans obtained by 
the government of Cameroon. The final sections outline the economic attributes of the project and the social and 
environmental impacts of the project. 
The main findings are that the delay in the implementation of the Petroleum Environment Capacity Project 
(CAPECE) could not be blamed alone on the government of Cameroon's lapses but also on the World Bank, which, 
until 2003, had only disbursed about 10% of the relevant credit that was to finance the project. This was also in 
violation of local legislation, in which the government is mean to assess the construction impacts during the 
implementation stages. In addition, although part of the financial plan was to make funds available for Cameroon to 
direct towards social services, the country continues to use most of its oil revenue for the servicing of its external and 
domestic debts. 
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2 Introduction 
Unmanageable foreign debts are dragging down many of the most impoverished countries in the world. The 
development of African countries has always been premised on its ability to use its natural resources as a viable 
vehicle to uplift itself from poverty and under-development. This assertion after over forty years following the political 
independence of most Africa countries seems to be a mere rhetoric. With poverty becoming endemic, Africa 
countries have for a long time resorted to loan financing for development purposes. These countries have over the 
years become indebted with huge sums contrived from international financial Institutions, like the World Bank, 
private banks and export credit agencies, for the purpose of improving the living conditions of their population. Many 
accept the economic theory of loan financing for development purposes. While, in Africa, the loans contracted were 
in many instances not committed to projects that would help enhance the general welfare of the populations. Such 
white elephant projects are bound throughout in Africa. The best of such projects increase national growth rates (on 
paper) whereas little or nothing trickles down to the poor communities who are usually affected negatively by the 
project, as most of the returns are channelled in paying foreign debts. 
While there have been clamour calls for the cancellation of such debts which many consider as odious and in many 
instances illegitimate, most of the donor countries and multilateral institutions remained unsympathetic to such calls 
and instead designed programs and projects which were believed would help these countries repay their debts and 
contribute to economic development. In several instances they only contributed with their austerity measures in 
plunging the populations into situations of deep poverty and misery and having considerable impact on the 
environment. 
The Chad Cameroon Pipeline project, transporting oil from the oil rich fields in southern Chad through over 800 
kilometres of Cameroonian territory, is an example of such projects. This study, explores evidences of the 
illegitimate nature of the debt the government of Cameroon incurred for the construction of the Chad-Cameroon 
Pipeline Project, in view of presenting these debts as a case for a fair and transparent arbitration tribunal for their 
cancellation. 
2.1 The Political Economy of Chad and Cameroon 
Cameroon and Chad are both classified as low income countries by the World Bank and depend on primary product 
exports for their foreign earnings. Chad is a landlocked country and its only access to sea is through Cameroon which 
serves as an entry and exit port for Chad's exports and imports. The World Bank ranked Chad as the fifth poorest 
country in the world. Chad's per capita GNP is 96,000FCFAand life expectancy is less than 50 years. Infant mortality 
rate is very high; one child out of every five dies before his fifth birthday. 
Economic development in Chad is dominated by agriculture, which in most cases is subsistence and employs over 
80% of the country's population. Financial aid from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and other 
sources is directed largely at the improvement of agriculture, especially livestock production. Chad has a very small 
formal sector and a large thriving informal sector. Chad's export sector for quite a long time was primarily dominated 
by cotton accounting for about 40% of all Chadian export in 1999. Together with the countries of the CFA franc zone, 
Chad has since 1995 engaged in the implementation of World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programs 
which culminated in 2001 with the IMF announcement that Chad qualifies for the HIPC debt relief initiative. The Doba 
oil development project remains Chad's best bet out of its dire poverty situation to push forward its economic 
development. However, as would be seen in the analysis below Chad's oil may be doing little to ameliorate the living 
conditions of the Chadian masses and may only be beneficial to the ruling patriarch. 
Politically, Chad just like many African countries had been governed as one party dictatorial state dominated by more 
than three decades of military regime since the 1975 military coup that saw the overthrow of the independent civilian 
elected government of President Tombalbaye. The division of the country between the Christian/animist south and 
the Moslem dominated north has continued to dominate Chadian politics and this political trend was to an extent a 
crucial factor in the oil development project. The accession of President Idris Deby through a military coup in 
December 1990 and the introduction of multiparty party politics ushered in an uneasy peace which culminated to the 
organization of a sovereign national conference and the first multiparty democratic elections in1995. The 1995 
elections and the organization of other elections since then have been raven with political tension and non-
acceptance of the results by the opposition parties with a traditional accusation of electoral rigging by the incumbent 
Deby's party, the MPS. 
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Chad long years of civil war and political instability have impacted greatly upon the country's human rights records 
with rampant extra-judicial killings, suppression of freedom of expression, press and association. The U.S 
Department of State Chad country report on Human Rights Practices released in 1998 highlighted the country's 
human rights situation. As of now with pockets of rebellion in the country championed by former aides of President 
Deby, it is not clear whether Deby still has political domination of the country. 
Table 1 Socio-Economic Conditions in Chad 
CHAD World Average 25 highest GNP 
countries average 
Quality of Life GNP per capita 96.000FCFA 
($160) 
3,078,000FCFA($5,130) 15,522,000FCFA 
($25,870) 
Infant Mortality rate 115 per 1000 births 54 per 1000 6 per 1000 
Literacy Rate Males 62% 79% Near universal (both 
genders) Females 35% 62% 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
Males 47 65 74 
Females 50 69 81 
Pupil-Teachers ration (primary 
school) 
62 32 17 
Population Total Pop 7 million 5,754 million 919 million 
Avg.annual pop 
growth 
2.3% 1.2% 0.3% 
Births per 
woman 
5.6% 2.8% 1.7% 
Health and 
Sanitation 
No access to 
health care 
74% n/a n/a 
People per 
physician 
30,030 3770 522 
No access to 
safe water 
76% 22% 6% 
No access to 
sanitation 
79% 53% 8% 
Adult HIV-1 
prevalence 
2.7% 0.6% 0.3% 
Economy GDP 
Avg.annual 
growth 
1980-1990 6.1% 3.1% 3.2% 
1990-1995 1.5% 2.2% 2.0% 
Inflation, avg. 
annual growth 
1980-1990 1.1% 15.0% 4.8% 
1990-1995 8.9% 56.6% 2.5% 
Labour Force 
Sectors 
Agriculture 83% 49% 10% 
Industry 4% 20% 33% 
Services 13% 31% 57% 
The situation in Cameroon is not very much different and though Cameroon until the mid 1980s enjoyed relative 
economic growth and was considered an African success story, it has been ranked as a low income country with life 
expectancy slightly above 50 years and a per capita GNP of about 336,000FCFA. The slip into recession of 
Cameroon's economy in the 1980s was largely due to the following main factors; a drop in commodity prices for its 
main exports, an overvalued currency and gross economic mismanagement aggravated by very high rate of 
corruption. As of 2004 before the country's attainment of the completion point of HIPC, its public debt was 69.1 % of its 
GDP. After about two decades of undergoing a rigorous economic recovery programs under the supervision of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund within the structural adjustment programs under which the country 
contracted several structural adjustment loans, Cameroon could be said to have attained a level of economic 
recovery far ahead of other countries of the sub region but still has a low level of development. 
11 The Contribution of Oil to Debt and Under-Development in Africa 
Table 2 Socio-Economic Conditions in Cameroon 
Cameroon World Average 25 highest GNP 
countries average 
Quality of Life GNP per capita 336,000FCFA $5,310 $25,870 
Infant Mortality 54 per 1000 births 54 per 1000 births 6 per 1000 
Literacy Rates (age 
+ 15) 
Males 75% 79% Near Universal (both 
genders) Females 52% 62% 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Males 55 65 74 
Females 52 69 81 
Pupil-teacher ratio 46 32 17 
Population Total Population 14 million 5,754 million 919 million 
Avg. annual pop 
growth 
2.4% 1.2% 0.3% 
Births per woman 5.5% 1.7% 
Health and 
Sanitation 
No access to health 
care 
85% n/a n/a 
Persons per 
physician 
11.996 3,770 522 
No access to safe 
water 
59% 22% 6% 
No access to 
sanitation 
60% 53% 8% 
Adult HIV -1 sero 
prevalence 
30% 0.6% 0.3% 
Economy GDPAvg. 
annual growth rate 
1980-1990 3.3% 3.1% 3.2% 
1990- 1995 -1.0% 2.2% 2.0% 
Inflation Avg. annual 
growth rate 
1980-1990 5.9% 15.0% 3.2% 
1990-1995 5.1% 56.6% 2.0% 
Labour Force Sector Agriculture 70% 49% 10% 
Industry 9% 20% 33% 
Services 21% 31% 57% 
Source: Official Chad-Cameroon Oil Development and Pipeline Projects Documents 
Politically, Cameroon's democracy remains problematic same as most of the countries of the sub region. Cameroon 
unlike the other countries of the central Africa sub region has enjoyed relative political calm with sporadic disruptions 
in 1984 as a result of a failed coup d'etat and the disturbing early years of the introduction of multiparty politics 
democracy in the 1990s. Cameroon has since independence been governed by two autocratic regimes; late 
President Amadou Ahidjo who ruled from 1960 to 1982 when he resigned and President Paul Biya who has since 
1982 remained the incontestable ruler. Cameroon had under the reign of the later witnessed unprecedented 
economic recession coupled with very high rates of corruption, gross economic mismanagement. In 1999 and 2000 
it was classified as the world's most corrupt country by the German based NGO, Transparency International. In 
terms of its human rights records, it has not been impressive as noted by US State Department report on human 
rights of 1998 with reports of extra-judicial executions, suppression of certain liberties such as freedom of speech, 
association and press. Also it has also not paid greater attention to the respect of the rights of the pygmy indigenous 
forest communities. 
2.2 Scope and Methodology of Study 
This study presents the Chad Cameroon pipeline project and explores evidences on the illegitimate nature of debts 
incurred by the Cameroonian government within the framework of the Chad Cameroon Pipeline project, in view of 
building a case for arbitration. It looks at the political, socio-economic and environmental implications of the Chad 
Cameron Pipeline Project from the pre-construction to the construction and post-construction or exploitation phases. 
It also investigates the rationale of investing in projects that hold little or no benefits to communities affected by 
poverty and underdevelopment and only cause a swelling of the debt burden of the host countries. 
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Within the perimeter of the set objectives of the study we shall also critically consider the role of the international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank in increasing the debt burden of developing countries by pushing for 
projects that are more representative of corporate than people centred interests. Despite the fact that Chad is at the 
centre of the project most of the analyses in this study are based on the impact of the project on the Cameroonian 
side. 
The different phases of the Chad Cameroon Pipeline Project have been highly documented. As such, much of the 
information in this result is as a result of desk research. Nevertheless, a one-week field visit was carried out to the 
Kribi-Lolodorf stretch of the Pipeline, during which discussions were held with fishing communities, Bagyelia / Bakola 
pygmies and others affected by the project. 
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3 Development Aid and the Economic Paradox of Oil 
There have been very controversial positions on the impacts of debt/aid on development. Debt and aid could be in a 
narrow economic context being considered as busters of economic growth. The emergence of the Asian economic 
white tigers has been used as a good illustration of the how debt financing and aid could help achieve development 
that transcends basic macroeconomic theories. However, the Asian economic success story is tainted by the 
economic crisis, which was caused largely by the concentration of most of the loans in the hands of selected families. 
The situation in Africa has not been different from that of Asia apart from the fact that Asia experienced an economic 
boom on the backbone of the contracted debts which helped lunch its economic development. The situation is same 
with Latin America with Brazil, Argentina considered as the most indebted developing countries and apart from the 
structural adjustment programs have never been placed under debt relief initiatives as the HIPC. The question is why 
is Africa's debt situation different? A possible answer is that most of Africa's debt is illegitimate and odious, contracted 
in most cases for the personal welfare of the undemocratic regimes and not for the welfare of the general population 
living under the heavy burden of absolute poverty. 
Debt and aid financing in Africa have been directed mostly to the extractive industry sector hoping that it will harness 
social and economic development. However, in most cases this theory has been proved futile as examples are bound 
in Africa where the extraction of oil, gas, mineral resources and logging have instead led to development chaos 
riddled with poverty, corruption, human rights abuse, dictatorial regimes and civil wars. Whatever reason is advanced 
for using natural resources, as a potential vehicle for poverty alleviation and development remains an illusion void of 
any visible reality. While the viability of natural resources, such as oil, as a contributor to development will not be 
discussed; this study will consider and question the increasing role of both private sector enterprises like oil 
companies, banks and public sector financing in oil development and how this contribute to the odious debt burden of 
mostAfrican countries. 
Empirical evidence by world renowned economist, Jeffrey Sachs using available data of 87 countries remarked in 
1995 that developing countries hugely dependent on natural resources tend to be poorer than countries which are 
not. Still along the same analysis of the above remark by Jeffrey Sachs, it could be deduced that the debt burden of 
mostAfrican oil exporting countries, was contracted during the oil boom years of 1970s. The relative high prices 
enjoyed by oil exporters led to the following scenario which had a direct relationship with the present debt burden: 
• Increased oil revenues allowed oil-exporting countries to increase their spending dramatically in 
anticipation of continued higher export earnings. 
• Increased oil revenues improved the credit ratings of oil exporting countries internationally, giving 
them access to vast amounts of capital at relatively low interest rates. 
• Increased oil revenues have greatly increased human rights violation, conflicts and instability in 
Africa. A striking example is the recurrent conflict in the Ogoni region of Nigeria that has seen the 
death of several poor people amongst them the renowned activist Ken Sara Wiwa. Other conflicts 
like the long civil war in Angola and Sudan, rebellion and insurgent outburst in Chad and Nigeria 
are all related to the management and distribution of oil revenues. 
In recent times global focus on Africa has been on the Gulf of Guinea, which has emerged as a new destination for 
new investments in the extractive industry sector by both the industrial economies of the west, and new emerging 
economies like China. The rush for the Gulf of Guinea's newly found wealth is spurred by the constant political 
instability in the Middle East, which hitherto has remained a traditional oil supplier to both the USA and Europe. The 
gulf of Guinea today prides itself as the new haven for oil multinationals with the discovery of oil in countries 
considered before now as not having any economic potential. The entry of countries like Chad and Equatorial Guinea 
demonstrates the geo-political importance of the region to the energy market. It is therefore in the above-mentioned 
context that we place the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project for which both host governments contracted huge 
loans. 
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4 Description and Rationale of the Chad-cameroon Pipeline 
Project 
The Exxon-Mobil, Petronas and Chevron Consortium are developing oil fields in Doba, southern Chad. The project 
comprised the construction of a 1,070-kilometer pipeline from the oil fields to Cameroon's Atlantic coast at Kribi, three 
related pumping stations, ancillary facilities, infrastructure improvements, and installation of an offshore Floating 
Storage and Offloading vessel with an 11-kilometer submarine pipeline from the coastline near Kribi to the vessel. 
The Consortium and the Governments of Chad and Cameroon prepared the Pipeline Project, with the assistance of 
the World Bank, IFC and other public and private lenders, from 1993 to 1999. The Consortium and the Government of 
Chad established the TOTCO (Tchad Oil Transportation Company S.A) and the Consortium and the Governments of 
Chad and Cameroon established COTCO (Cameroon Oil Transportation Company S.A). These two joint venture 
companies own and operate the Chad and Cameroon portions of the Export System. Esso Export and Production 
Chad, Inc. is the Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project's manager and operator, responsible for overall 
coordination of the Pipeline Project. 
Figure 1; The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline route 
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Source: Exxon-Mobil website 
The Chad-Cameroon oil development and pipeline project remains the single largest private investment in sub 
Saharan Africa. It involves the exploitation of three hundred oil wells in the southern region of Chad transported along 
a 1070 km pipeline. The pipeline is expected to carry about one billion barrels of crude oil over thirty years through the 
1,070 km pipeline to the Atlantic coastal town of Kribi in Cameroon. The project total cost at the initiation stage of the 
project was estimated at about $ 3.5 billion, however in an October 2004 presentation, ExxonMobil put the project 
total cost at $ 4.2 billion. The major characteristics of the project apart from the pipeline included three pump stations 
and a marine terminal equipped with an offshore flooding loading facility vessel that will transport the oil to the 
international market. The pipeline cuts across Cameroon's tropical rainforest, which serve as home to the indigenous 
pygmy communities of Cameroon, and as a haven for certain rare plant and wildlife species. 
The project rationale that necessitated the World Bank's participation was to use the project as an example of how oil 
exploitation could lead to development, enhanced transparency and public participation. The Bank's consistent 
rationale for its involvement in this gigantic project and in other oil or resource extraction in developing countries is 
that it can contribute to poverty reduction by generating economic growth. 
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It has premised its participation on the following points : 
• Enhanced economic growth, 
• Increased government revenues that can be used to finance poverty alleviation initiatives and the 
provision of essential public services 
• Create jobs 
• Facilitate the transfer of technology 
• Lead to the improvement or construction of essential infrastructure 
• Catalyze the growth of lateral or downstream industries 
Critics have described the bank's projections in support of the Chad Cameroon Pipeline Project and other oil projects 
as being at odd with realities of oil projects and in most cases inconsistent with the Bank's stated mandate of poverty 
alleviation. Since late 2000, the Doba Basin oil project has stimulated major investments into Chad and it is expected 
to double government tax revenues by 2004, It is hoped that this project will serve as a catalyst for the entire economy 
by helping to reduce energy costs and attract additional trade and investment in other sectors. The question remains 
whether Chad will continue to consolidate its economic reforms and invest its oil revenues wisely in order to 
encourage a wider range of economic initiatives. 
Recent political controversy surrounding, the dispute between the World Bank and the Government of Chad over the 
latter's decision to redirect oil revenues from poverty alleviation to security spending, the contested 2001 presidential 
election and a continuing rebellion in northern Chad have continued to dampen Chad's economic prospects by 
exposing the weaknesses in Chad's political institutions. 
4.1 Financing the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project 
The Chad-Cameroon Oil Development and Pipeline Project has been described as the biggest single private 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and a glaring example of public-private partnership initiative. The project 
witnessed the participation of varied stakeholders from both the private and public sectors with divergent interests 
and goals. For the World Bank, an institution which brands itself as having a development mandate, this was a good 
opportunity for Chad and Cameroon to enhance their development. The private and public sector lending arms of the 
Bank (IFC and IBRD) were approached as far back as in 1992 i.e. four years after the oil consortium had signed the 
exploitation convention with Chad i.e. in 1988 and when negotiations were being initiated between the governments 
of Cameroon and Chad. Other Bank's institutions involved in different types of negotiations either with the 
governments or the consortium were the IDAand MIGA. 
The consortium sourced the bulk of financing for the project principally through international financial markets, 
leveraged mainly by World Bank's participation. The private sponsors were ExxonMobile of the United States (the 
operator, with 40 percent of the private equity), Petronas of Malaysia (35 percent), and Chevron of the United States 
(25 percent). 
The objectives of CAPECE are to: assist the Government of Cameroon to develop and establish a national capacity 
for the environmental management and monitoring of the Pipeline Project; and on a medium-to long-term basis, to 
help ensure the environmental sustainability of future projects, programmes and policies in the petroleum sector in 
Cameroon. Public funding for the project was only 4% but was significant, especially considering the poor credit 
rating of Cameroon and Chad at that time. 
Negotiations for the World Bank participation in the Chad-Cameroon project that started in 1992 were motivated on 
the need to help facilitate the consortium raise money from the international financial markets and as a political 
insurance. However, there was also the need for Cameroon and Chad to participate in the project as equity holders in 
the two oil transportation subsidiary companies created in a bid to operate the single oil transportation system. The 
upstream company was the Tchad Oil Transportation Company (TOTCO) and downstream in Cameroon was the 
created the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (COTCO). In 1997 the Government of Cameroon and COTCO 
signed a Convention of Establishment that was approved as Cameroonian Law No. 97-16 on 7 August 1997. COTCO 
is a private company based on equity participation between Cameroon and Chad on the one hand and the 
consortium comprising of ExxonMobil, Chevron and Petronas, 
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Cameroon equity holding in COTCO is very small as to the more than 50% by the consortium. Cameroon's 
participation was enabled by a 2001 IBRD loan of about USD 53.4 million (Loan No. 7020). 
At the same time another public sector loan was negotiated and contracted with the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
of about USD 29.6 million. Apart from loans to help acquire equity in the oil transport companies, other loans were 
contracted to help the government of Cameroon build its capacity as to help monitor and mitigate the environmental 
and social impacts of the project 
Apart from loans from the public financing institutions such as the IBRD and the IDA, the EIB, the African 
Development Bank through its Exim Bank, export credit agencies the IFC also made a USD 100 million loan to the 
consortium and helped leverage another USD 300 million syndicated loan from the international financial markets 
with the participation of major private commercial banks. The World Bank's total financial commitment in the project 
was about USD 259 million. There have been several questions as to whether it was worthwhile for governments of 
the two host countries to contract such heavy debts for projects that hold little benefits for the local populations and 
the environment and largely a private sector project 
More than half of the total cost of the project was met by the oil consortium or equity partners ExxonMobile, Chevron 
and Patronasi which covered the full cost of oil field development and one third of the export facilities. The pipeline 
evolved into a 4.2 billion USD project, the largest investment in sub-Saharan Africa at the time, with contributions from 
the World Bank group (IBRD loans to Chad and Cameroon 92.9 million USD, IFC loan 200 million USD), EIB 41.5 
million USD, Export Credit Agencies (US EXIM Bank with 200 million USD, COFACE (France) with 200 million USD, 
African Ex-lm Bank with 500 million USD). 
4.2 Loan Financing for Cameroon 
In June 6,2000 Cameroon received loan approvals from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Financial Corporation (IFC) respectively to finance the Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project (Loan No. 7020-CM) and the Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement (CAPECE) Project 
(Credit No. 3372-CM). The Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 7020-CM) of about US$53.4 
million was to finance Cameroon's equity participation in the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (COTCO), 
where it holds less than 20% of the Company's total equity shares. 
4.2.1 The Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement (CAPECE) Project Loan 
Problematic within the context of the present study is the CAPECE Project loan which amount to about US$5.77 
million. The CAPECE Project was to build the government of Cameroon's capacity to protect and mitigate the social 
and environmental impacts of the pipeline project. It included the following components: 
a. Strengthening of the local institutional, regulatory and legal framework. This was supposed to help in the 
drafting, dissemination and enforcement of implementing regulations for environmental legislation: 
strengthening the enforcement capacity of all agencies involved in the EMP implementation and monitoring, 
through technical advisory services for drafting and implementing environmental legislation and 
administrative procedures, including the training of staff, other stakeholders and judicial and legal officers 
and public information campaigns. It was also helped to establish a long-term vision study which was 
supposed to identify and evaluate the options for an effective and sustainable environmental regulatory 
framework for the petroleum sector, through the provision of technical advisory services. 
b. Strengthening coordinating capacities for environmental management. This was supposed to strengthen 
the capacity for central coordination of the Permanent Secretariat of the Pipeline Steering and Monitoring 
Committee (PSMC) and three PSMC Field Units, which report directly to the PSMC Permanent Secretariat. 
c. Public intervention capacity for environmental management. This objective was centred on three main 
areas; public health management, Government Oil Spill Response Planning and Implementation and the 
decentralized services of the administrative services of the various ministries in the vicinity of the pipeline 
constructed under the Pipeline Development Project (PDP). 
d. Project management, monitoring and evaluation. This last objective was focused on two main areas which 
included the establishment of an International Advisory Panel tasked to prepare and disseminate reports 
related to biophysical environment, marine biology, socio-economy and environmental health; and the 
establishment and maintenance of a project management, monitoring and evaluation system and an 
environmental management information system to respond to the needs of the PSMC. 
Though these four-point objectives seem laudable, its fulfilment leaves very less to be desired and questions in 
essence the raison d'etre of the loan. 
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5 The Economic and Legal Framework of the Pipeline 
The oil development and pipeline project was regarded as the only possible realistic way for Chad to improve the 
quality of life of its citizens and for Cameroon to use the transit fees and royalties for its poverty alleviation 
programs . It is estimated the life span of the project was 25-30 years, and the commencement of revenue flows 
started in 2003, with an initial payment of $ 6.5 million into Chad's escrow account at Citibank in London. Over the life 
span of the project, it is estimated that the project could bring Chad revenues of about $200 million per annum, 
resulting in a doubling of the country's budget. World Bank reports portray a much bigger Chadian boom coupled with 
the increasing Chad's portion of the revenue paid into the escrow account. Ten percent of the received revenue is to 
be deposited in a Future Generations Fund, while 72% is to be for capital investment in the five designated social 
priority sectors; education, health and social services, rural development, infrastructure, and environmental and 
water resources and 5% to the oil producing region. 
According to the project documents, it is expected to stimulate private commercial investment in the petroleum sector 
in the two countries. Some of the projected economic benefits apart from that to the governments were that the 
project would generate employment for the local communities particularly those traversed by the pipeline. For 
Cameroon, the estimated royalties of about $42 per barrel are expected to help swell the government's budget. As of 
September 2006, Cameroon is estimated to have received almost 36 billion Francs CFA paid directly into the Central 
Treasury. However, these two governments lack any effective governance machinery to ensure that the expected 
revenues from the project trickle down to the poor. In Chad, the Bank initiated an innovative program, an oil revenue 
management law that was adopted and enacted into law by the Chadian National Assembly in 1999. The adoption of 
this law was a major clause in the loan agreement signed between Chad and the Bank. For the Bank, the Chad-
Cameroon oil development and pipeline project was to serve as a new model of using oil and gas projects to attain 
poverty alleviation goals. 
Key features of the system include the following; 
• All direct revenues royalties and dividends are paid by the ExxonMobil consortium into Chadian 
government-controlled escrow accounts at Citibank in London. Indirect revenues income taxes 
on the oil companies, customs duties, and all other fees and charges are paid directly into Chad's 
treasury. 
• After debt payments to the World Bank and European Investment Bank are withdrawn from the 
Citibank account, the remaining direct revenues are allocated as follows: 10% to a Future 
Generations Fund to save for the post-oil era in Chad, 72% to capital investments in five "priority 
sectors" to fight poverty: education, health and social services, rural development, infrastructure, 
and environmental and water resources, 4.5% to the oil-producing region in southern Chad as 
additional, earmarked funding, and 13.5% to Chad's treasury for discretionary spending until 
2007. Thereafter, these funds will be divided among priority sectors. 
• Ajoint government-civil society Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee a.k.a. the 
College established with the authority to approve or reject specific projects financed by direct oil 
revenues. 
In Cameroon, there was no similar mechanism put into place to monitor the project's revenue. However, it is not clear 
whether the Comite Pilotage et de suivi des pipelines (C.P.S.P) or Pipeline Monitoring Steering Committee, set up by 
the Cameroonian government to monitor and represent government's interest was to equally monitor the revenue 
flow or it was still the prerogative of the National Hydrocarbon Corporation (SNH) which coincidently houses the 
CPSP. SNH management of oil revenues in Cameroon has also been a problematic issue lacking in all aspects of 
transparency. The Corporation's first stage in ensuring transparency in the oil sector followed the formal adhesion of 
Cameroon onto the EITI. However, whatever plans were put in place were considered by critics as short-lived 
especially regarding that governance in the two countries has remained very obscure especially regarding the 
management of public funds. These critics were proved right when in late 2005 the Chadian government for instance 
decided to amend the Revenue Management Law and thereby jeopardizing the whole essence of the project. 
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For Chad and Cameroon, the project presents a good economic and development opportunity in advancing the plight 
of millions of their people in dire poverty situations. Thus these countries had a crucial stake at both the pre-
construction phase period to ensure the project took off with little or no hitches. 
At the background of the project, the government of Cameroon undertook the development and adoption of a 
plethora of new laws. In Cameroon the effectiveness of these new legal instruments to adequately ensure that the 
project remains sane in light of environmental, economic and social concerns remain problematic. In Cameroon the 
design of the project was to take into consideration the main legal instruments that are to be applicable to all such 
projects. The 1996 Environmental Management Framework Law, the 1998 Petroleum Code and the law on the 
transportation of hydrocarbons remained vital to the regulation of the project. However, the international short falls of 
the laws and the Host State Agreements (HAS) signed between the project sponsors and the respective 
governments, made it difficult for the effective implementation of the laws/3). For instance the HSA made it difficult for 
any of the governments to change the regulatory environment around the project except with the consent of the 
consortium. Another instance is the COTCO Convention of Establishment with the Government of Cameroon signed 
on July 14 1997. The Convention is drafted in such a way that it undermines the country's national law and its 
ambiguous provisions on the application of international laws leave little policy space for the host country. 
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6 Social and Economic Implications of the Pipeline 
Oil exploitation and human rights have traditionally had an uneasy relationship. Oil companies have always been 
denounced for their complicity in human rights violations throughout Africa. The participation of the World Bank in the 
CCPP is considered as a turning point in the Bank's relationship to human rights and private sector led investment. 
However, the Chad-Cameroon project failed to depart from past oil experiences. When the project was put forward 
for approval to the Bank's Board of Directors NGOs globally requested the Bank to put a moratorium on the project to 
allow a proper assessment of the human rights situation in the two countries. 
The human rights problems generated by the project directly or indirectly impacted on the ability of the traversed 
communities to freely enjoy their socio-economic rights. In a request to the World Bank Inspection Panel submitted 
by the Centre for Environment and Development (CED) in September 2002, a wide range of human rights abuse 
cases emanating from the project were raised. The Inspection Panel Investigation report released after a field visit to 
Cameroon in February 2003 to some extent confirmed most of these cases. 
The none or insufficient compensation for the expropriation of land, on which the local communities or individuals 
hold customary rights and registered land deeds, remains a problem which years after completion of the construction 
phase of the project still is unsettled. According to the CED Inspection Panel Request of September 2002, at 
Makoure, a village close to the pipeline terminal in Kribi, Mr. Bissadibang's plantation of exotic forest species 
destroyed to make way for the pipeline was ruled out from the individual compensation process. Following an 
assessment report by the Cameroonian Ministry of Environment and Forestry the destroyed value of the wood was 
estimated as being between CFAF1 500 000 and 6 500 000 (US$ 2,150 and US$ 9,285). COTCO acting on behalf of 
the consortium accepted the assessment report and only paid about CFA F 650,000 and the concerned accepted this 
amount which also included food and alcohol after being coerced in the presence of COTCO by the administration in 
signing a contract considered "fair and genuine...satisfactory and sufficient" . Other cases of human rights abuse 
include the non-respect of the rights of workers and the provision of inadequate equipment for the workers which had 
been the root causes of several industrial accidents during the construction phase of the project. In the Obala Zone 
for instance two welders working for one of COTCO sub contractor; Willbros lost their sights and after initial treatment 
by COTCO they were all abandoned without any further treatment . 
Most of the abuses suffered by the workers of the pipeline are abuses sanctioned by the Cameroon Labour Code 
adopted by Law No. 92/007 of August 14 1992. In many of the cases registered for instance the workers had no 
employment contract and therefore subjected to indiscriminate termination of their contracts without any redress. 
The 1992 Labour Law was therefore made redundant in its application to the pipeline project even though its 
application in Cameroon is universal. The concept of trade union recognized under the Code was outlawed in the 
pipeline project and where workers in demanding for either better wages or improvement in their working conditions 
were often considered as disturbing public peace. A classical example was an agreement signed between Doba 
Logistics Company, a sub contractor of the consortium and its employees to have the workers' working conditions 
improved. However, two months after the signing, the company declined to respect its obligations and this led to an 
industrial strike by the workers, an act permissible by the Cameroonian labour code but instead of engaging in 
constructive negotiations, the company in contravention of the laws of the host state country decided to dismiss some 
of the workers. In other instances forces of law and order were called in to quell down the strike as was the case in 
Ngoumou in January 2003 when some of the ex-workers of Willbros who were abusively dismissed demanded for 
their rights to be paid . 
The employment advantages promised to the local communities remained illusory and there have been conflicting 
view points of what the communities really benefited from the project. According to a 2003 reports?) by the Centre for 
Environment and Development, the situation of those employed by the sub contractors of COTCO is far from being 
an acclaimed success story as claimed by the consortium. According to the report, the employment opportunities that 
were heralded before the commencement of the project and even after were seriously blown out of proportion by the 
consortium as the actual employment rate in the field was not realistic. 
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EssoChad, subsidiary of ExxonMobil and representative of the consortium in the host states on its part alleges that in 
terms of employment, the project between 2005 and mid 2006 had employed about 6.400 Chadian nationals and 
1.300 Cameroonian nationals indicating a percentage workforce of 92%. It however fails to mention that more than 
70% of these employments were temporal and with duration of from one day to at most three months. 
6.1 The Non-respect of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples 
The Chad-Cameroon pipeline traverses the tropical forest of Cameroon, a home to the semi-nomadic 
Bakoia/Bagyeli pygmy communities. These communities live within 2km of the pipeline route in settled communities 
interspersed with Bantu Villages with whom they share a long-term relationship. Because of the peculiar nature of 
this sensitive group of peoples and in conformity with the World Bank Operational Directive OD 4.20, the consortium 
together with the government of Cameroon was urged to prepare an Indigenous Peoples' Plan (IPP) which is 
presented in the Environmental Management Plan (EMP). The Plan states that the "[tjhe IPP includes three 
programs: health, education, and agriculture and are described in section 5.0. Within each, an initial set of potential 
projects have been identified as a result of studies and in consultations sponsored by the project..." The IPP was 
meant to provide a development framework for these vulnerable peoples who have been subjected to mistreatment 
by their Bantu neighbours. The IPP had to be developed within the framework of the CAPECE Project and to be 
implemented by FEDEC. However, this Plan at its initial stage faced serious problems which could be attributed to the 
delay of the launching the activities of FEDEC and according to the Inspection Request submitted to the Panel the 
pygmies were unable to benefit from the mitigation measures envisaged under the project. Critical of the IPP 
preparation was the absence of any effective inclusion of the pygmies and the baseline data survey ignores the 
occupation of the Bakoia/Bagyeli occupation and the use of forest resources outside the pipeline right-of-way(9). 
Though most of the problems suffered by the pygmies could be attributed to the late implementation of the IPP, there 
are other problems suffered by the pygmies independent of the IPP. The pygmies generally were not included in the 
compensation plan and in most cases where their lands were expropriated the compensations were paid to their 
Bantu neighbours. Though the Cameroonian land law recognizes the concept of customary rights to land, for the 
pygmies this was discarded. The CED Panel Request raised this as a critical issue to be considered by the Inspection 
Panel. In one example highlighted in the request of where a pygmy whose food crop farm was destroyed, no 
compensation was paid to him while his Bantus neighbours received compensation for their destroyed crops though 
in most cases too not adequate. These peoples had also lost valuable livelihood resources such as the drying up or 
pollution of rivers and streams which serve as sources of drinking water and fishing and as a result of noise during 
construction causing disturbance to wildlife, the main activity of these peoples which is hunting has been seriously 
affected. 
6.2 The Issue of Compensation 
Both national and international law recognizes that any expropriation must be carried out only after adequate 
compensation has been paid out to the victims. In Cameroon, the Ministry of Agriculture and other legal texts such as 
the 1994 Forestry law have enshrined this principle in a 1981 legal text; the 1996 Environmental Management Law 
and other specific texts recognize this legal principle. 
On the insistence of both national and international NGOs, COTCO and TOTCO drew up a comprehensive 
compensation plan to compensate all those affected by the project. However, the inherent weakness of the 
compensation plan was its failure to consider the market value of property lost by local communities. It also did not 
prepare communities on how to use the lump sums given to them as compensation. As such the amounts given to 
people for life time investments were squandered within a short period of time in consumer goods and initiatives like 
buying household wares and getting married to more women. Three years after the payment of these 
compensations, beneficiaries are poorerthan they were before the project came. 
In an established database of outstanding claims of compensation by some of Cameroonian NGOs working with 
most of the affected communities indicate that at the close of the construction phase of the project there are still 
almost 276 cases of either none or inadequate compensation pending with COTCO. In most cases COTCO has 
discarded some of the claims as invalid and has beenis very slow in dealing with even the cases it considers as valid; 
an approach that seemingly is to fatigue the claimants especially as it entails expenditure such as transportation 
costs for the claimants to travel almost 400 km to COTCO headquarters in Douala. 
y. The Inspection Pane! Executive ; n 
21 The Contribution of Oil to Debt and Under-Development in Africa 
The compensation plan also envisaged regional or community compensations that were to serve the benefit of the 
whole communities. The choice of projects was supposed to be that of the affected communities and depending on 
their most pressing needs. However, COTCO was keen in deciding for the communities irrespective of their priority 
needs. An instance of what may be termed as misplaced priority for some of the communities is the case of the Village 
of Saballi which after broad community consultation decided to use their regional compensation for the electrification 
of their village. COTCO however insisted for a community hall despite the fact that the village with a very small 
population already had a community hall. This community and those around Kribi are still claiming compensation for 
the destruction of a reef that harboured lots offish, which have greatly reduced the catch of local fishermen. 
6.3 The Health Impact 
Large infrastructure projects have been proven of having the potentials to exacerbate health problems in and around 
the project area. The Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline had not proven contrary to this assertion as demonstrated by 
several field reports that set out to investigate the health situations along the pipeline . These reports provide 
evidence of the worsening health situations of the affected populations attributed to the direct consequences of the 
pipeline. Some of the health problems arise from both environmental negative impacts such as pollution of water 
sources upon which communities depend. The pollution of river sources did expose the inhabitants to water borne 
related diseases such as typhoid, malaria with the creation of standing waters, diarrhoea and skin diseases. For 
instance in Mbikiliki, a village in the south of Cameroon, the pipeline traverses the village stream which has served as 
water source for the village. The destruction of the stream did cause a major health crisis in the village and even 
though the project sponsors were informed of the situation and their promise to redress the situation has remained 
unfulfilled. In Mpangoe village the construction of the pipeline trajectory had to disrupt the course of a stream 
creating stagnantwaterinfrontof the compound of Chief Savah. 
Photo 1: Stagnant water between the Pressure reduction station and the House of Chief Savah in Mpangoe 
Photo by Samuel Nnah, survey data 
There has also been a widespread of sexually transmissible diseases along the pipeline route and there have been 
speculations for instance that the HIV/AIDS rate along the pipeline project surpasses the national prevalence rate 
estimated to be about 5.4% 
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The increase in HIV and AIDS along the pipeline could be explained with the large influx of migrant workers during 
the construction phase of the project and the widespread of prostitution especially among minors in the villages. The 
consortium had even before the commencement of the project paid less regard to health as evident of its three-page 
health impact assessment released in 1991 and which was discarded by the World Bank as insufficient. A study 
conducted in 2001 by the Swiss Tropical Institute quotes a sero prevalence of 8 and 15% in Sarh and Kelou, two 
villages close to the pipeline 12). There have been established cases of foreign employers working with some of the 
sub contracting companies of COTCO involved in prostitution with minors. Under both Cameroonian international 
law such cases are considered criminal and liable for prosecution but where such cases were identified the accused 
according to the villagers interviewed were simply repatriated out of the country rather than face any prosecution. 
The spread of HIV and AIDS and other diseases now common in the area could link as a direct consequence of the 
project though in most political discourses this has been far from being ascertained. For instance while 
acknowledging the increase in HIV and AIDS in areas traversed by the pipeline in Chad, the Chadian Minister of 
Health is reluctant to establish a clear nexus to the project) 13). 
6.4 The Environmental Impact 
The environmental impacts of huge infrastructure projects such as the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline could not be 
undermined. Coupled with infrastructure development is the inherent environmental impact of fossil fuels such as its 
contribution to climate change. This among others was the reasons for the Bank Extractive Industry Review (EIR) 
Commission recommendation that the Bank need to consider its role in the extractive industry. At the inception of the 
project, NGOs and some foreign governments such as the Dutch and German governments raised concerns over 
the inadequacies of the environmental impact assessment that was released by the consortium. In response to these 
concerns the consortium released new environmental studies that attempted to consider some of the raised 
concerns such as the rerouting of the pipeline from ecological fragile areas. It could be deduced that some of the 
environmental problems caused by the project could be directly linked to the insufficient application of the World 
Bank Operational Directive OD 4.01 on Environmental Impact Assessment. In both the request for inspection and the 
investigation report of the Inspection Panel in 2003, this aspect was largely decried. The Inspection Panel in their 
report cites the non-application of the Paragraph 13 of OD 4.01 which requires that for large projects, there is need for 
an independent Panel of Experts. In the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project no such Panel was put in place during 
both the preparation and approval of the Environmental Assessment and Environmental Management Plan and thus 
the EMP released in 1999 had never been subjected to any independent review. Neither the IAG nor ECMG, which 
constitute part of the World Bank supervision role, could qualify as fulfilling the role of the IPE. 
One of the most significant of the environmental impacts is the destruction of biodiversity. Despite rerouting the 
pipeline, a great proportion of it still cuts through Cameroon's tropical forest, an area rich in biodiversity. This has 
instead increased the rate of logging and disappearance of species considered as exotic. For instance species such 
as Azobe, bubinga, moabi, iroko, bibolo, kossipos, ayous with important economic values are greatly disappearing in 
the regions traversed by the project. Though the environmental assessment provides for the creation of two national 
parks as for the lost of biodiversity, the Mbam et Djerem and Campo Ma'an national parks, the biodiversity around the 
Atlantic Littoral coast which host the pipeline terminal is still under threat. The pipeline has also help facilitate and 
increase the rate in the trade in bush meat especially of protected species, a practice outlawed by the Cameroonian 
wildlife legislation. The mitigation measure proposed by the EA studies on inhibiting the trade in bush meat was a 
prohibition of employees of the pipeline from hunting bush meat during working hours or while staying at the workers' 
camp This mitigation measure seems very unsatisfactory and leaves less to be desired especially as 
enforceability remains vague. 
One of the greatest environmental damage, which also qualifies as a social impact, is the destruction of a natural reef, 
a natural habitat of fish during the construction of the pipeline terminal. The destruction of this reef has caused the 
disappearance of several fish species and has also impacted upon the fishing activity of the local populations around 
Kribi. Despite a promise to artificially reconstruct the rift, little or nothing has been realized according to recent field 
reports. Also the marine ecological setting was greatly disturbed during construction and even with the flow of oil as 
oil spills are not favourable to fish growth. Another potential environmental impact is that of oil spillage that could 
cause uncalculated environmental damage to the sea and destruction to marine life around the pipeline terminal in 
Kribi. 
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It is worth noting that the creation of the Campo Ma'an National Park to mitigate biodiversity loss along the pipeline 
route, itself created more social problems. The indigenous Bagyeli Pygmies who were living in the forest now erected 
into a National Park were asked to leave the forest with no compensation or resettlement plan. 
6.4.1 The Oil Spill Response Plan 
The pipeline would hold 250 000 barrels of oil for a total length of 1050 km with one stop valve every 35 km. In case of 
spilling of total oil volume contained in pipeline section separated by two stop valves a total of 8333 barrels will spill. 
International standards require that for oil pipeline projects there is a need for the response plans to be approved 
before the commissioning of the pipeline. However, in the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project the response plan, which 
was to be released at the same time with the EA studies in 1999, was still awaited at the time the first oil barrels were 
pumped into the pipeline. According to the World Bank's African Office the oil spill plans which include both area 
specific oil-spill response plans (ASOSRPs) and national oil-spill response plans (NOSRPs) as of the end of 
December where neither available nor approved. The released draft COTCO plan has been criticized as riddled with 
inadequacies and in contravention of a raft of international regulations . The Plan has not been subjected to any 
independent external review and only ExxonMobil's associated company [Oil Spill Response UK Ltd] has approved 
the project. The National Oil Spill Response Plan was to be developed within the framework of the CAPECE Project 
and the delay in the implementation of CAPECE could consequently be linked to the delay in the preparation and 
approval of the NOSRP prepared by the government. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study raises a couple of questions as to the loans contracted by Cameroon to participate in the project. The full 
failure or delay in the implementation of the CAPECE project has been considered either as directly or indirectly 
contributing to most of the socio-economic and environmental problems generated by the pipeline project. 
The delay in the implementation of the CAPECE project could not be blamed alone on the government of Cameroon's 
lapses but also on the Bank, which until 2003 had only disbursed about 10% of the relevant Bank credit that was to 
finance the CAPECE project. This meant that it was impossible for the CPSP to maintain a permanent field presence 
during the construction phase. The delay or failure in the implementation of the CAPECE project was in gross 
violation of OD 4.01 Paragraph 12 on the strengthening of the environmental capacity for the government to 
effectively assess construction impacts during the implementation and monitoring phase of the project. Cameroon 
continues to use most of its oil revenue for the servicing of its external and domestic debts as was the case for 2004. 
An October 2005 audit by the government estimated its domestic debts and arrears to equal to about 1.5 billion francs 
CFA . 
The CAPECE loan is a good case for the fair and transparent arbitration tribunal. The people of Cameroon should not 
repay the loans on the grounds that it has failed to serve its interest in building capacity to help mitigate the negative 
impacts of the project. The institutional legal architecture that was supposed to help confine some of the problems 
remains debatable such as the environmental impact assessment decrees of application approved only in 2005 
demonstrate the inadequacies of CAPECE. The Bank also failed to monitor the effective implementation of its own 
policies by the consortium despite recommendations by its own designed institutions such as the IAG, the Inspection 
Panel and the ECMG. 
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